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CAN WE LEARN TO INCENTIVIZE MORALITY?: A
DISCUSSION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ON AN
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
INTRODUCTION
Four letters: A, T, C, and G. Those four letters represent the nucleic acids
that build humans. 1 From the time we are conceived until the day that we die,
those four letters control our life. We have altered fruits, and we have changed
animals. What if you are next?
The technology is here, and it is happening. The question of whether we
should alter the human genome is no longer something we can ignore because
we lack the capabilities. Germline cells are the cells in the body that reproduce. 2
So, any changes to those cells are passed on to future generations. 3 CRISPRCas9 is a tool used to edit the genome in a “faster, cheaper, and more accurate”
way than ever before. 4 It allows for the genetic manipulation of DNA. As a result
of CRISPR-Cas9, the international community has had strong debates over the
manipulation of germline cells. 5 Would the world tolerate genetically modified
babies?
In 2018, the world welcomed Lulu and Nana into the world. 6 A scientist, He
Jiankui, claims to have used the CRISPR technology to edit these two Chinese
girls’ genomes to decrease their risk of contracting HIV. 7 The claim prompted
serious uproar within the scientific community. 8 Jennifer Doudna, one of the
biochemists who helped to develop the CRISPR technology, stated that “[t]his
work is a break from the cautious and transparent approach of the global
scientific community’s application of CRISPR-Cas9 for human germline

1
See generally Kristin Hendrickson, Why Humans Need Nucleic Acids, LIVESTRONG, https://www.
livestrong.com/article/383411-why-humans-need-nucleic-acids/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2019).
2
What is CRISPR-Cas9?, YOUR GENOME (last updated Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.yourgenome.org/
facts/what-is-crispr-cas9.
3
Id.
4
Id. Previous genetic mutations were done through chemicals, radiation, or gene targeting. Id.
5
Id.
6
He Jiankui, About Lulu and Nana: Twin Girls Born Healthy After Gene Surgery As Single-Cell
Embryos, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=1&v=aezxaOn0efE.
7
Ron Stein, Chinese Scientist Says He’s First to Create Genetically Modified Babies Using CRISPR,
NPR (Nov. 26, 2018, 5:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/11/26/670752865/chinesescientist-says-hes-first-to-genetically-edit-babies.
8
Id.
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editing.” 9 But, is there a problem if it is just a small change to help prevent a
deadly disease?
Editing the human genome in a way that can be passed down to subsequent
generations has been considered off-limits until now. 10 There are two main
rationales behind this historical restriction. First, even the smallest mistake in
germline editing could have catastrophic effects on future generations as the
change is passed down. 11 Second, even if we are able to ensure no mistakes are
made, once we begin playing this game it “open[s] the door to ‘designer
babies.’” 12 The consequences of using CRISPR-Cas9 in this manner raise
concerns that germline editing is “an extremely premature and questionable
experiment in creating genetically modified children” and that “this amounts to
unethical and reckless experimentation on human beings, and a grave abuse of
human rights.” 13 So we are concerned, and it is happening already. Is there
anything we can do about it?
Let us take it one step further. What if the scientists who edit embryos want
to protect their creation and process with a patent? A patent is a legal protection
for a product of human ingenuity. 14 A patent owner gains a property right to an
invention from the government in exchange for certain disclosures. 15 The
patentee secures the right to exclude others from “making, selling, offering to
sell, using, or importing the invention” during the patent term. 16 If we allow
patents on edited embryos and the human genome we give someone a property
right over part of a human being. 17
This controversy is just one of many that infiltrates the discussion of
biotechnology, but those who create and invest in biotechnology want rights that
will be protected. 18 Biotechnology involves “techniques for using the properties
9

Id.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id. (quoting Jeffery Kahn and Marcy Darnovsky).
14
JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 8 (Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2016).
15
Jon Schuchardt, Basic Patent Law: II. Patents as Exclusive Rights, DILWORTH IP (Feb. 18, 2013),
https://www.dilworthip.com/basic-patent-law-ii-patents-as-exclusive-rights/.
16
35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018).
17
See generally DAVID KOEPSELL, WHO OWNS YOU?: THE CORPORATE GOLD-RUSH TO PATENT YOUR
GENES 1 (Michael Boylan ed., 2009) (“Now, thanks to creative interpretations and applications of patent laws,
parts of living things can be owned. Patents have been issued, in surprisingly large numbers, on the essential
building blocks of multiple life-forms, including humans—including you.”).
18
Biotechnology Patents at the EPO, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/news-issues/
issues/biotechnology-patents.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2018) (biotech patents represent roughly 4% of the
applications received by the European Patent Office).
10
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of living things to make products or services.” 19 The field and the desire for
patent protection are not new phenomena; they go back more than two hundred
years. 20 As the biotechnology industry flourished, society craved the benefits of
the technology without always anticipating the prospective consequences. 21
Patent protections are not transnational because patents are territorial and
only valid in the jurisdiction(s) of grant or registration specified by national
law. 22 In formulating a way to cope with any moral concerns, each jurisdiction
opted for an individualized approach. 23 Thus, when a scientist goes to the local
patent office and wants to patent the methods of editing embryos and the edited
embryos themselves, the grant of a patent will depend in part on where the
scientist files the patent application.
No global patent exists today. 24 Despite that truth, moral concerns are not
constrained by the jurisdictional borders of patent laws. 25 Globalization
facilitated the swift spread of technology internationally. 26 In responding to the
technological dissemination, one country may decide that moral concerns
outweigh the benefits of patenting a particular biotechnology, but that unilateral
action is insufficient to phase out the fears on an international level because of
the limited reach of patent rights. The patent right serves as a reward for genuine
innovation and an incentive to continue innovating. 27 Unless the actors across
the international community decide that giving such a reward is not worth the
risk of facing the morality concerns then, an inventor can simply choose to patent
19

Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 47 n.1 (2001).
Biotechnology Patents at the EPO, supra note 18.
21
See generally Sang Yup Lee, Biotechnology: What It Is and How It’s About to Change Our Lives,
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/12/what-is-biotechnologyhow-will-it-change-our-lives/.
22
GUIDES TO INFORMATION SOURCES, INFORMATION SOURCES IN PATENTS 59 (C.P. Auger ed., Bowker
Saur 1992). While many countries have their own national patent offices, there are regional patent offices such
as the European Patent Office and the African Regional Intellectual Property Organization. See generally
ARIPO, http://www.aripo.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2019); EPO, https://www.epo.org/index.html (last visited Feb.
4, 2019).
23
Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology in Patent Law, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 494 (2003) (discussing the diversity of approaches that can result from “localized
cultural norms and political structures”) [hereinafter Patent First, Ask Questions Later].
24
GUIDES TO INFORMATION SOURCES, supra note 22, at 59.
25
Murphy, supra note 19, at 47 (2001) (“genetically modified organisms could be developed and released
into the global environment”).
26
Aqib Aslam et al., Globalization Helps Spread Knowledge and Technology Across Borders, IMFBLOG
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://blogs.imf.org/2018/04/09/globalization-helps-spread-knowledge-and-technology-acrossborders/.
27
Margo A. Bagley, Stem Cells, Cloning and Patents: What’s Morality Got to Do with It, 39 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 501, 504–05 (2005) (describing how patent rights are “designed to promote the progress of science and
useful arts by rewarding innovation with temporary exclusivity) [hereinafter Stem Cells, Cloning and Patents].
20
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their invention in a jurisdiction without heightened morality considerations. The
worldwide development of biotechnology fosters the need to revisit how
morality and patent laws can work together if society determines that an
invention is not worth the risk.
This Comment argues that the time has come to incorporate morality
concerns into patent deliberations so that society has a mechanism should it
decide a technology should not be pursued. First, this Comment will examine
some of the moral concerns behind biotechnology and why these concerns are
important on an international level. Second, it will discuss how the United States
and Europe have approached patenting biotechnology through their national
patent systems, with a focus on cases that relate to humans. Finally, this
Comment will propose a solution that involves a new international
recommendation that will affect how national and regional patent office’s
approach morality both individually and as part of the international community.
I.

A DISCUSSION OF MORALITY CONCERNS

The discovery of DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953 laid the groundwork
for an impressive new field of technology—biotechnology. 28 In the 1970s, when
biotechnology really came into its own, the general public feared that the classic
story of genetically modified humans in Brave New World would become a
reality. 29 Because these new technologies exploit biological processes, the field
faces tough moral concerns. 30 These moral issues include scientists concerns
about human safety, clashes with religion, and animal cruelty. 31
The moral issues surrounding biotechnology are particularly important in the
face of patent protection. 32 It is important to understand that not all
biotechnology carries moral unease. 33 In fact, the field has the potential to
improve the life and health of everyone on the planet, 34 but the fact remains that
a patent on the human genome would give someone a property right in a part of

28
The Francis Crick Papers: The Discovery of the Double Helix, 1951–1953, NIH, https://profiles.nlm.
nih.gov/spotlight/sc/feature/doublehelix (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
29
William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 195 (1990) (citing
Researcher Warns of Brave New World of Genetics, K. C. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1978, at 1) [hereinafter Patenting
Medical Technology].
30
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 494.
31
Patenting Medical Technology, supra note 29, at 294–95.
32
See Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA (2002) (UK).
33
Patenting Medical Technology, supra note 29, at 295.
34
Id.
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a human being. 35 Despite being less concerning to some people, a patent on any
biological process gives a person ownership over some lifeform. Society needs
a venue for their opinions about the future of this type of innovation to be
recognized.
Scientific abilities have far surpassed the ability to use biological processes
with technology. 36 Therefore, the question for the society is not “can we?” The
question is “should we?” And if so, where do we draw the line? Finally, who
makes these decisions? These questions are not limited in the way that patent
rights are limited, but rather, affect a number of different countries and even
have the potential to affect all living beings. 37 It is within these questions that
the moral objections to biotechnology lie.
In its most basic form, morality is defined as “the rightness, or wrongness of
an action.” 38 We each individually determine which actions we consider to be
right or wrong. The subjective nature of morality creates issues for legal
determinations because morality can depend on the person, the place, or the time
an issue is considered. Humans are constantly changing over time, leading to
society’s viewpoint changing. 39 People can de-sensitize themselves to
information or shift their viewpoints based on inherent selfishness. 40 For these
reasons, specific legislation creates its own issues because it confines a moral
determination to an ever-changing landscape of convictions. 41
Biotech patents tend to generate one of two main moral objections “(1)
objections to a patent based on concerns about the morality of practicing the
patent’s underlying subject matter . . ., [and] (2) objections to a patent based on
concerns regarding the morality of allowing anyone to limit the practice of the
patent’s underlying subject matter.” 42 Both objections cover different concerns
about the biotech industry, and both are equally important in an overall
discussion of morality and biotechnology.
Morally controversial objections that are directly concerned with inventions
underlying subject matter include objections to human cloning or animal
35

See generally KOEPSELL, supra note 17, at 1.
See generally Edward Teller, Science and Morality, 280 SCIENCE 1200, 1200–01 (1998).
37
See generally Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 494.
38
Id. at 475 (citing WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 402 (MacMillan 1996)).
39
Stem Cells, Cloning and Patents, supra note 27, at 502.
40
Id.
41
See id. (pointing out that specific legislation also creates problems because of the growth of
technology).
42
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 475, 495 (“Biotechnology is an area in which many
morally questionable inventions are generated”).
36
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chimeras. 43 These types of inventions create a host of concerns among societies
because they involve changing the fundamental nature of a living creature to
create something new, or copied. The objections towards a patent’s underlying
subject matter can stem from a variety of different sources or concerns.
Usually, people consider the concerns around human DNA first because that
directly affects them. For human DNA specifically, concerns work around the
fact that each nucleotide sequence is responsible for “our individual traits.” 44
Beyond that, DNA is directly responsible for building what we see when we
look in the mirror. Patenting human DNA has already been prohibited in a
variety of countries. 45 However, at least in the United States, an inventor can
still obtain a patent over cDNA. 46 Although the court found a difference between
cDNA and DNA, from a scientific perspective both forms of DNA occur in the
body and are necessary for development. 47
People struggle with biotech inventions that either use or change human
DNA because in the simplest of explanations, DNA builds humans—you, me,
and everyone around us. 48 One Pew Research Center study shows that even as
of 2018, 27% of adults believe that changing a baby’s gene to treat a serious
disease or condition takes technology too far. 49 If the technology needs to be
tested on human embryos the numbers drastically increase, with 65% finding
that this use takes medical technology too far. 50 As is typical when discussing
morality, these statistics change based on religiosity, gender, and familiarity.51
Importantly, almost half of the adults interviewed believed that gene editing
would lead to an increase in inequality, science being used in morally

43
See id. at 490 (defining chimera as “creatures made, in theory, by blending human cells with those of
various animals such as mice, chimpanzees, pigs, or baboons”).
44
KOEPSELL, supra note 17, at 22, 24.
45
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
46
Id. The segments of DNA that code for RNA are called “exons.” The non-coding regions are called
“introns.” The difference between cDNA and DNA is that cDNA “contains only the exons that occur in DNA,
omitting the intervening introns.” Id.
47
See Megan Krench, New Supreme Court Decision Rules That cDNA Is Patentable What It Means for
Research and Genetic Testing, SCI. AM. (Jul. 9, 2013), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/newsupreme-court-decision-rules-that-cdna-is-patentablewhat-it-means-for-research-and-genetic-testing/.
48
KOEPSELL, supra note 17, at 24.
49
Cary Funk & Meg Hefferon, Public Views of Gene Editing for Babies Depend on How It Would Be
Used, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (July 26, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/07/26/public-views-of-geneediting-for-babies-depend-on-how-it-would-be-used/.
50
Id.
51
Id. Those who tend to be more accepting of gene editing for babies tend to be men, the less religious,
and the more familiar with gene editing. Id.
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unacceptable ways, and technology being utilized before science reaches a full
understanding of gene editing’s effects. 52
The prevalence of religious beliefs regarding the creation of life and
conception contribute to some moral patenting concerns. 53 Creation of life
constitutes a central component to several religious constituencies. 54 To fully
address such moral concerns, it might be necessary to ask more existential
questions about what people want science to achieve and if there should be any
limits to innovation. 55 Unfortunately, even those questions are predicated on
more complex philosophical questions. The idea that these questions about life,
science, and its limits are answerable is a fallacy, and yet some decisions would
need to be made in order to effect any change. To respond adequately to these
inquiries would require a decision maker. If that authority is given to a legislative
body then the international community would be required to pick which
legislative body’s decision to abide by. 56 Even if an agreement could be made
regarding who would field these questions, there would never be agreement as
to the response. Morality is not static and rightness or wrongness is a belief not
a fact. 57 It would be erroneous to presume society as a whole could ever come
to a definitive conclusion on a belief. 58 There is no one right answer. Yet, if
people determined that they want to prevent controversial biotechnology from
disseminating across the globe there has to be a general consensus on at least
some of the most prominent and vital concerns facing us today.
The second moral objection to patents deals with limiting rights of use by
the general public due to patent rights. 59 A patent on a medical procedure brings
this type of moral objection to light because the right to exclude means that
52

Id.
Drew Endy & Laurie Zoloth, Should We Synthesise a Human Genome, COSMOS (May 12, 2016),
https://cosmosmagazine.com/society/should-we-synthesise-a-human-genome.
54
Id.; see also David E. Anderson, Religious Leaders Question Genetic Engineering, UPI (Nov. 13,
1987), https://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/11/13/Religious-leaders-question-genetic-engineering/3966563778000/
(“[r]everence for all life created by God may be eroded by subtle economic pressures to view animal life as if it
were an industrial product invented and manufactured by humans”).
55
See generally Regulating and Patenting Transgenic Animals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On
Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
396, 405 (1987) (statement of Rabbi Michael Berenbaum, Scholar-in-Residence, Religious Action Center of
Reform Judaism) (noting the importance of asking “what are the limits of scientific knowledge and what are its
frontiers. Should there be constraints on scientific experimentation . . . ”).
56
See generally Stem Cells, Cloning and Patents, supra note 27, at 507.
57
See id. at 502.
58
See generally Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 536 (discussing how there is a “lack
of consensus on when life begins for human embryos and fetuses used for research purposes” and this supports
having Congress making a decision as to its patent eligibility).
59
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 495.
53
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doctors cannot use the procedure to help their patients. 60 Ultimately, the patient
would suffer.
It is human nature to value one’s own health. Everybody wants to survive
and to do this we have to invest in our own health. If patents on medical
procedures take away a person’s ability to be treated for certain diseases, then
arguably patents take away the option to obtain the optimal level of health. 61 At
least in the United States, there is no constitutional right to health. Even without
its status as a fundamental right, the right to health is in some measure
aspirational. 62 There are glaring issues of right and wrong when we develop new
technology or processes but cannot effectively use them to “improve life
conditions and health” for all. 63
Biotech investors who invest their money behind these medical procedures
want patent protection. 64 The biggest industries that have come out of the last
sixty years, including the biotech industry, grew with the help of patents. 65 The
Biotechnology Innovation Organization, the leading industry trade organization
representing biotechnology, refers to patents as the “lifeblood of the
biotechnology industry.” 66 Some even suggest that “investments in the biotech
industry are based entirely on patents.” 67 If moral considerations play such a big
role that patents are denied, society could end up suffering as well. 68 Without

60

Id. at 499.
See generally Beata Gocyk-Farber, Note, Patenting Medical Procedures: A Search for a Compromise
Between Ethics and Economics, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1527, 1544–46 (1997). Beyond a patent holder’s ability
to refuse to license their invention, a patient’s restricted access to a medical procedure can be due to a spike in
price due to the monopoly given to the patent holder which can ultimately leave the patient without access. Id.
at 1544–45.
62
Human Rights and Health, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.who.int/
news-room/fact-sheets/detail/human-rights-and-health (“[t]he right to health is one of a set of internationally
agreed human rights standards”).
63
Eduardo Missoni & Guglielmo Foffani, Nanotechnologies and Challenges for Global Health, 3 STUD.
ETHICS L. & TECH. 1, 1 (2009).
64
See Ronald Rosenber, Call to Ban Gene Patents Stirs Industry Fears, BOSTON GLOBE, May 19, 1995,
at 39.
65
Marshall Phelps, Response, Do Patents Really Promote Innovation? A Response to the Economist,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2015, 2:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/marshallphelps/2015/09/16/do-patentsreally-promote-innovation-a-response-to-the-economist/#7dc67f941921.
66
Area of Focus, BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION ORG., https://www.bio.org/bio-areas-focus (last visited
Oct. 27, 2018).
67
Matthew Herper, New Patent Law Would Trash Disease Cures, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2015, 11:02 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/03/24/new-patent-law-would-trash-disease-cures/#389a5cd
24d5f.
68
See also Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 536 (patent legislation could “[reduce]
discoveries and innovations in certain biotech areas of inquiry, a consequence which cannot be dismissed
lightly”).
61
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investments in the biotech industry, society closes itself off to improving health
and life for all.
Not surprisingly, many doctors strongly object to patents on medical
treatments that inhibit their ability to treat their patients. 69 Doctors serve people
for a living. The medical profession is built on philanthropic values and altruistic
motives. 70 Bringing economics and the right to exclude others into the medical
field commercializes a profession founded in the interest of greater good for the
public. 71 Historically, for the medical community, a better alternative to
commercializing medicine was to “set free a pack of ravening wolves in a
community” because commercialization would lead to “physicians and
pharmacists . . . [degenerating] into quacks and charlatans . . . [who] take
shameful advantage of the community for gain.” 72 The American Medical
Association (AMA) has even taken a stand in the discussion. The AMA
condemns the patenting of medical procedures because of the ethical duty to
share medical information. 73
That such views may be held by doctors and other medical professionals is
not all that unexpected due to their field of choice but also due to the status of
health as a fundamental right. 74 The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights is a United Nations treaty that protects people’s right to “the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” 75
One hundred sixty-nine countries have ratified this treaty and protect health as a
fundamental human right including almost all of the developed nations, with one
important exception. 76 The United States signed the treaty in 1977 but has failed
to ratify it. 77 Because the morality concerns behind biotechnology affect the
69
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 500; Gocyk-Farber, supra note 61, at 1534
(describing how patent law has disfavored patents on “medical advancements” due in large part to physician
dissatisfaction).
70
Patenting Medical Technology, supra note 29, at 263.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 265 n.9 (citing Stewart, Is it Ethical for Medical Men to Patent Medical Inventions?, 29 J.A.M.A.
583, 586 (1897)).
73
See Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 500 (noting that “[t]he patenting of medical
procedures poses substantial risks to the effective practice of medicine . . . [and the AMA] believes that it is
unethical for physicians to seek, secure, or enforce patents on medical procedures.”) (citing AMA Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical Procedures, reprinted in 53 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 341, 351 (1988)); Gocyk-Farber, supra note 61, at 1549.
74
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 12, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3.
75
Id.
76
Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS, http://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited Feb. 5,
2019).
77
Id.
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global community, it is important to understand that the United States is an
outlier in that it regards health as an aspirational goal rather than a fundamental
human right. In a way, patent rights on medical procedures hinder that
fundamental right by removing a viable treatment option, unless the treatment
can be licensed. 78 To give away rights that limit our ability to treat diseases
through a certain procedure hinders one of the core purposes of medicine.
Some patent laws recognize these moral considerations when medical
procedures are involved. In 1997, the U.S. Congress adopted a statute protecting
doctors from a patentee’s right to exclude by prohibiting a patentee from
enforcing his or her rights against a doctor. 79 The United States is not alone in
its efforts. The European Patent Office cannot grant patents on methods of
treatment or medical procedures. 80 Article 52(4) of the European Patent
Convention prohibits the patenting of “methods for treatment.” 81 Notably, the
article does not prohibit instruments used during these methods. 82
Unfortunately, these mechanisms may not be sufficient to overcome the moral
concerns relating to these types of patents.
Ultimately, the moral considerations may override other policy
considerations, specifically that of the incentive to innovate, when dealing with
medical methods. Without patents on medical methods, society runs the risk of
delaying leaps in innovation that can save people’s lives. 83 Some people may
believe that doctors may simply innovate to maintain their Hippocratic Oath,
which obligates them to practice their craft “for the benefit of the sick.” 84 Even
if that it is true that the medical methods business is less commercially
competitive and the urgency for patent protection is not as high, denying patents
on the subject matter has the grave potential of stalling vital progress. 85 It is a
fine balance that society should grapple with.

78

Gocyk-Farber, supra note 61, at 1544–45.
35 U.S.C. § 287(c) (2000).
80
Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52(4), Oct. 5, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 270 (as effected in
2001) [hereinafter EPC].
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Weldon E. Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner Process Infringer: Greasing the Squeaky
Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 61 (1999) (“The argument advances the
view that, absent medical process patent protection, investors would lack an economic incentive to fund costly
clinical research.”) (citing George J. Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils of Patenting, 14 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. (June 1984), at 25–26.).
84
Gocyk-Farber, supra note 61, at 1544 (citing TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS,
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 138 (1978)).
85
Id. at 1542–43; Havins, supra note 83, at 61.
79
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Similar to the incentive to innovate, morality considerations also have their
downsides. If patent law, on an international level, is to include a discussion of
an invention’s morality, then by definition someone must make that
determination. For some people, giving that power to an individual, or even a
group of individuals, creates a bigger problem than the morality concerns
themselves. 86 When fallible people start to create requirements, society risks
“improvident rules (if not outright abuse of the privilege).” 87
Beyond the concerns surrounding who makes the rules, affording morality
too much weight may hinder the good that can come from patenting
controversial biotechnology. 88 The logical argument does not stray far from that
of the morality concerns themselves. If the society chooses not to patent morally
controversial biotechnology then investments in that technology may decrease
in an already high-risk industry. 89 With less money from investments,
researchers and developers may not achieve the full promises that biotechnology
can bring. 90 Without a doubt, the promises of biotechnology are tremendous.
The technology could revolutionize areas such as “climate change, an aging
society, food security, energy security[,] and infectious diseases, to name just a
few.” 91 Not only does the industry have the capabilities to solve some of the
world’s biggest problems, but it can do so rapidly such that by 2030 societies’
use of biotechnology may parallel the use of the internet. 92
Understanding how morality and biotechnology interact is only one piece of
the puzzle. Before any proposal could succeed on an international level, different
perspectives of incorporating morality considerations into patent law must be
understood.
II. TWO DIFFERING APPROACHES PATENT OFFICES TAKE TO PATENTING
MORALLY CONTROVERSIAL TECHNOLOGIES
The international patent environment is a collection of national patent
systems. 93 Even at regional patent offices, the members endow the regional
86

See Kevin E. Noonan, Foreword to DAVID KOEPSELL, WHO OWNS YOU?: SCIENCE, INNOVATION, AND
at ⅹⅳ (Wiley Blackwell 2015).
87
Id.
88
Id. at ⅹⅴ.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Lee, supra note 21.
92
Id.
93
Ben McEniery, The Time is Nigh: A Proposal for an International Patent System, 16 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 167, 168 (2016).
THE GENE PATENT WARS,
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office with the ability to create rules and grant patents. 94 Minimum standards of
intellectual property protection are set by the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”). 95 However, the TRIPS
Agreement does not require harmonization, and countries may develop
distinctive rules to further specific policy objectives such as incentivizing
innovation or protecting morality. 96
The TRIPS Agreement does have a morality provision in Article 27 that
specifically allows countries to exclude patents “which [are] necessary to protect
ordre public or morality.” 97 Countries are given the choice to implement
statutory language that would make morally controversial inventions
unpatentable. The following subsections will explore the mechanisms used by
the United States and Europe to determine the patentability of morally
controversial inventions.
A. The United States’ Approach
Congress regulates patent laws in the United States. Its authority to govern
this area of the law comes directly from the Constitution which provides that
Congress shall have the power to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 98 Congress created the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to exercise this power. 99
The USPTO reviews a patent application on an invention, and if the patent
application meets the statutory requirements then a patent will be granted. 100 The
application process acts like a bargain. Patentees want rewards for their

94
See also MARGO A. BAGLEY, RUTH L. OKEDIJI & JAY A. ERSTLING, INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW &
POLICY 124 (West 2013) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW & POLICY].
95
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 127, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
96
Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention Creation Activity Boundary in Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 577, 579 n.7 (2009) [hereinafter New Invention Creation]; Dominique Guellec, Patents as an Incentive to
Innovate, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: IP POLICY FOR INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION, 46, 55 (2007) [hereinafter Patents as an Incentive to Innovate]. “Encouraging innovation” is a
problem that governments are constantly trying to solve. Id. at 55.
97
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 95, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 at art. 27(2).
98
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; see generally Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 483
(discussing how the provision used to create the US patent system comes from “useful arts” because the term
“science” did not mean what it means today).
99
About Us, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/about-us (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
100
See generally 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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innovation—the patent protection. 101 The USPTO gives the reward in exchange
for certain disclosures including the enablement of the invention. 102 The
application must enable those skilled in the art to make and use the invention
without undue experimentation. 103 Enablement allows the USPTO to facilitate
information dissemination. The patentee adds to the collective knowledge of
society and for that they receive patent protection. 104
1. The Utility Requirement
In order for a patent to be granted on an invention, the examiner at the
USPTO must find that the patent meets the standards set forth in § 101, including
that the invention is “new and useful.” 105 However, the statutory requirement of
utility, which is now an easily satisfied condition, was a tool that courts would
use to evaluate an invention’s morality. 106 A patent applicant did not need to
prove an invention’s moral utility, but the patent could be invalidated in
litigation by arguing that an invention lacked moral utility. 107
Moral utility is a judicially created doctrine that heightened the standard of
an invention’s usefulness. 108 The standard originated from Justice Story’s jury
instructions during an 1817 case, Lowell v. Lewis: “[a]ll that the law requires is
that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society.” The word “useful,” therefore, was
“incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.”109
Courts used the doctrine to reject several controversial inventions. 110
The scope of the moral utility doctrine whittled away as defining societies
shifting views on morality became more difficult. 111 Eventually, the courts

101
Stem Cells, Cloning and Patents, supra note 27, at 504–05 (describing how patent rights are “designed
to promote the progress of science and useful arts by rewarding innovation with temporary exclusivity”).
102
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
103
See id.; Gene Quinn, Patent Drafting: Understanding the Enablement Requirement, IP WATCH DOG
(Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/10/28/patentability-drafting-enablement-requirement/id=
89721/ (discussing enablement and undue experimentation).
104
Dan L Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1575, 1576 (2003).
105
35 U.S.C. § 101.
106
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 489.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
110
See generally Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 489 (discussing how the court
rejected inventions relating to “gambling machines and fraudulent articles”).
111
Id.
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determined that Congress, and not the judiciary or the USPTO, should impose
any desired moral utility requirements. 112
Even today, the moral utility doctrine remains dormant. Litigants who are
fighting for a patent’s validity could attempt to resurrect the argument. Even if
the argument was successful, which is unlikely given the court’s current reading
of § 101, the most recent adaptation of the moral utility requirement, that “an
invention have at least one moral, legal purpose,” would be easily satisfied by
many biotech inventions that can improve health and cure diseases. 113
Beyond litigants, the USPTO could attempt to revive the moral utility
doctrine as a component of its test for utility. In 1998, an application filed on a
human-animal chimera, a scientifically created animal with part human DNA
and part animal DNA, provoked the USPTO into threatening to revive the moral
utility doctrine. 114 The patent office issued a media advisory insinuating that an
invention on a human-animal chimera would fail to meet the moral utility
doctrine. 115 The USPTO walked back its statement, admitting in its own
examination guidelines that it cannot reject a patent application based on
morality concerns and that “when the statutory patentability requirements are
met, there is no basis to deny patent applications . . . .” 116 Any future attempts
by the USPTO to reject patent applications on moral grounds would likely be
overturned by the courts given the Federal Circuit’s clear language in Juicy Whip
v. Orange Bang that there is “no basis in section 101 to hold that inventions can
be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply because they have the capacity
to fool some members of the public.” 117 The decision wiped out the moral utility
doctrine unless and “[u]ntil such time as Congress” amends the utility
requirements. 118
Without a change to patent law by Congress, the moral utility doctrine will
likely remain sidelined. The utility requirement is not the sole § 101 prerequisite
112
See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Patent First, Ask
Questions Later, supra note 23, at 489.
113
See Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367; Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903) (finding that the
true inquiry is to “establish[] not merely that the device has been used for pernicious purposes, but that it is
incapable of serving any beneficial end?”).
114
See U.S. Patent Application No. 10,308,135 (filed Dec. 3, 2002); Patent First, Ask Questions Later,
supra note 23, at 490.
115
Media Advisory, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms Having a
Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998), available at https://www.uspto.gov/about-us/news-updates/factspatenting-life-forms-having-relationship-humans.
116
Examination Guidelines for the Utility Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1095 (Jan. 5, 2001).
117
Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1366–68.
118
Juicy Whip, 185 F.3d at 1367; Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 492–93.
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that has been used to argue against patenting morally controversial technology.
Section 101 details the subject matter eligible for patent protection and is the
other basis used for arguing that morally controversial biotech should not be
patent eligible under United States patent law. 119
2. Patent Eligible Subject Matter
For an inventor to get a patent on an invention, it must fall within one of the
categories articulated in § 101 of the Patent Act. 120 Section 101 allows for a
patent on “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter.” 121 According to the Supreme Court, these four categories are broad
and inclusive, and were intended by Congress to include “anything under the
sun made by man.” 122 The Supreme Court has created three non-textual
exclusions to § 101: laws of nature, physical phenomena/products of nature, and
abstract ideas. 123
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Court addressed the question of whether a
living bacterium was patent eligible subject matter or an unpatentable product
of nature. 124 Chakrabarty was a microbiologist who had engineered a bacteria
with the ability to break down multiple components of oil, something no
naturally occurring bacterium could do. 125 First, the court laid out the limits to
subject matter eligibility under § 101. 126 The analysis considered these limits
against Congress’ statutory intent to “include anything under the sun that is made
by man” as eligible subject matter. 127 Ultimately, the bacteria qualified as
eligible subject matter because Chakrabarty’s discovery was “not nature’s
handiwork, but his own.” 128

119

See 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (noting that the terms “manufacture” and
“composition of matter” are expansive terms); see also Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 484
(2003) (“[A]n inventor need not specify which category her invention is properly classified in as long as it can
be encompassed within one of the four.”).
123
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
124
Id. at 303.
125
Id. at 305.
126
Id. at 309. Examples of these limits would include the law of gravity, E=mc2, or a natural element like
oxygen.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 310.
120
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Although the Court decided the bacteria was not a natural phenomenon, it
still faced grave concerns about patenting a living organism. 129 The Court found
it was “without competence” to tackle these concerns and that these issues of
morality are best left to the political branches. 130 The arguments provided some
value though as “they remind us that, at times, human ingenuity seems unable
to control the forces it creates.” 131
The Chakrabarty decision has had profound effects on U.S. patent law.
Importantly, the decision to allow a patent on the bacteria opened the door to the
biotech industry in the United States. 132 After the decision, the broad availability
of the patent protection to biotech subject matter helped the industry grow at a
large scale and with incredible efficiency. 133
The USPTO provided a further boost to biotechnology-based innovation
when it granted the “world’s first” patent claiming a higher-level life form on
the transgenic Harvard oncomouse. 134 The invention involved using human
DNA to modify a mouse, making it more susceptible to developing cancer.135
The patent claims notably excluded any reference to humans, likely to avoid
moral and legal concerns. 136
The oncomouse patent elevated two key issues: should patents be granted
for higher-order animals and how will the moral repercussions be addressed? 137
While the USPTO granted the patent on the oncomouse without challenge,
patent protection was not extended to the oncomouse in all jurisdictions. 138
During patent examination in Canada, the examiner rejected the inventor’s
129

Id. at 316.
Id. at 317.
131
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 316; see also Maureen L. Condic & Samuel B. Condic, The Appropriate
Limits of Science in the Formation of Public Policy, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 157, 167-168
(2003) (“At their cores, scientists are motivated by curiosity . . . . There are no necessary limits to scientific
curiosity—not even the limits of decency . . . .”).
132
See Dominique Guellec, Patent Design, THE ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN PATENT SYSTEM: IP
POLICY FOR INNOVATION AND COMPETITION, 114, 123 (2007) [hereinafter Patent Design]; Sarah Elizabeth
Hagan, DNA Real Estate: The Myriad Genetics Case and the Implications of Granting Patent Eligibility to
Complimentary DNA, 35 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 205, 210 (2014).
133
Patent Design, supra note 132, at 123.
134
U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed Apr. 12, 1988); see Keith Schneider, Harvard Gets Mouse Patent, A
World First, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1988; but see Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse, WIPO
MAG. (June 2006), http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2006/03/article_0006.html (the Supreme Court of
Canada rejected the patent claim to the mouse body but allowed the claim “on the process for obtaining the
oncomouse”).
135
Hagan, supra note 132, at 212.
136
Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse, supra note 134.
137
Id.
138
See INT’L PAT. L. AND POL’Y, supra note 94, at 233.
130
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claims over the product as being “outside the scope of the definition of
‘invention . . .’ of the Patent Act” but allowed the claims covering the process
of producing the oncomouse. 139 The applicants appealed the decision and the
case made its way up to the Supreme Court of Canada. 140
The subject matter eligibility requirement outlined in Canada’s Patent Act is
nearly a carbon copy of § 101. It defines an invention as “any new and useful
art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter . . .” 141 Instead of
adopting the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the Canadian Supreme
Court deviated from the logic that the broad scope of the statute included
“anything under the sun that is made by man.” 142 In fact, the Court found
Parliament’s intention to be clearly defined by the definition of invention as
including certain subject matter, but also, “to exclude other subject matter as
being outside the confines of the Act.” 143
The Court ultimately concluded that the oncomouse could not be categorized
as a “machine” or as a “composition of matter.” 144 If a patent were to be granted
on a higher-life form, it would require “the clear and unequivocal direction of
Parliament.” 145 Ultimately, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Canadian Court have reached the conclusion that a deviation from their verdicts
regarding the eligible subject matter would require an act by the legislature. But,
the two courts reached antithetic conclusions about what qualifies under the
national patent laws. The Canadian decision serves as a decisive alternative the
United States Court could have considered.
The United States Supreme Court stood firm in its convictions that § 101
created a broad definition of eligible subject matter. In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, the court reemphasized that “anything under the
sun that is made by man” is eligible subject matter when it upheld the patent
eligibility of plants—a higher life form. 146
Finally, the question of whether the human genome could be patented made
its way to the Supreme Court in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.).
Id.
Patent Act, R.S.C., c P-4 §2 (1985) (Can.).
Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.).
Id.
Id.
Id.
J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 134 (2001).
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Genetics, Inc. 147 The Court looked at claims on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,
which if mutated could lead to a substantially increased chance of developing
breast cancer. 148 The patents were littered with moral implications that the court
could have addressed, but following its decision in Chakrabarty, the Court left
the morality concerns out and simply focused on the judicially created
exceptions to uphold the patent on the cDNA. 149
Between the lack of a moral utility doctrine and the court’s broad
interpretations of patentable subject matter, moral considerations go virtually
unregulated under United States patent law. 150 Even under the new patent
statute, the America Invents Act (AIA), the only substantive limitation involves
the patenting of humans and excludes patents from issuing “on a claim directed
to or encompassing a human organism.” 151 While the U.S.’ approach is a weak
attempt to consider a patent’s moral implications, Europe’s approach takes a far
more sympathetic pursuit.
B. Europe’s Approach
Europe approaches patenting morally controversial biotechnology in a
strikingly different way than the United States. In order to understand how
morality considerations affect a patentee’s application in a European country,
you must first understand how to obtain a patent in a European country. This
Comment will discuss two routes an inventor can take to obtain a patent in a
European country.
First, almost all European countries have their own individual Patent
Office. 152 The national patents provide for rights within the country the
application was filed but not across Europe as a whole. 153 Alternatively, a patent
applicant can choose to file their application at the regional patent office. 154

147

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 583 (2013).
Id. at 583. At a very basic level, a mutation is a change in the genetic sequence. Even a small change
in one nucleotide can have a drastic effect on the individual cell or the entire body, id., but mutations are actually
extremely common in human cells, and most mutations are harmless.
149
Id. at 595–96.
150
See also Hagan, supra note 132, at 220; Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 490 (2003).
151
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33, 125 Stat. 284 (2001) [hereinafter America
Invents Act].
152
Geertrui Van Overwalle, Bend or Break? The Patent System in Crisis: Policy Levers Tailoring Patent
Law to Biotechnology: Comparing U.S. and European Approaches, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 435, 440 (2011).
153
Id.
154
Id.
148
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The European Patent Office (EPO) is a regional office that can grant patents
to European countries. 155 The members of the EU united with other states
including “Albania, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, San Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, and
Turkey” to form the European Patent Organisation in the hopes of creating a
uniform patent system for Europe. 156 The Organisation was established by the
Convention on the Grant of European Patents (EPC). 157 The EPC stipulates the
requirements for obtaining a patent from the EPO. 158 The EPO carries out the
Organisation’s mission to facilitate international cooperation and grants patents
in alignment with the EPC by using one review process to validate a patent for
all member states. 159
A single patent application grants a patentee the opportunity to procure
patent protection in any, or all, of the contracting members of the EPC. 160 During
the patent procurement process, a patentee must designate countries in which
they desire to obtain patent protection. 161 Each designation will require a
payment to the EPO. 162 Once a patent is granted and the decision is published
by the EPO, the patentee will receive a “‘bundle’ of individual national patents,”
which must be validated in each state to ensure that the patent is enforceable.163

155
See, e.g., European Patent Office, The European Patent Office, https://www.epo.org/index.html. The
EPO represents the European Patent Organisation. Niels Stevnsborg & Bruno van Pottelsberghe, Patenting
Procedures and Filing Strategies at the EPO, ECON. OF THE EUR. PAT. SYS.: IP POL’Y FOR INNOVATION AND
COMPETITION 155, 155 (2007).
156
See generally Legal Foundations, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/about-us/foundation.html (last
visited Oct. 25, 2018). There are currently thirty-eight member states, two extension states with agreements still
in force, and four validation agreements with non-member states that are in force. The current member states
are: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia,
Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Monaco, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, San Marino, and Turkey. The
extension states are Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. The validation states are: Morocco, Republic of
Moldova, Tunisia, and Cambodia. Id.
157
EPC, supra note 80; Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 518. Although much of patent
law is national, the EPO is an example of a regional patent office. Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note
23, at 517.
158
The Patenting Process, EUR. PAT. OFF., https://www.epo.org/learning-events/materials/inventorshandbook/protection/patents.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2018).
159
See generally Legal Foundations, supra note 156; STEVNSBORG & POTTELSBERGHE, supra note 155,
at 155-56.
160
Stevnsborg & Pottelsberghe, supra note 155, at 156.
161
The Patenting Process, supra note 158.
162
Id.
163
Id.
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After validation, each designated member state treats the patent as a national
patent. 164
Morality comes into play at the EPO through the subject matter requirements
of the EPC as described in Article 52 and Article 53. 165 Article 52 broadly
delineates the grant of a patent “for any invention[] which [is] susceptible of
industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step.” 166
Later provisions of the EPC limit the breadth of Article 52. 167 Unlike the United
States, the EPC contains a statutory morality bar, in Article 53, that prohibits the
granting of a patent on “[i]nventions the publication or exploitation of which
would be contrary to ordre public or morality.” 168 If a patent claim contravenes
the morality provision then the claim can be rejected. 169
If a patent has already been granted, a third party can still oppose the patent
based on Article 53. 170 The concerned party can bring an opposition to the EPO
“if they believe that [the patent] should not have been granted.” 171 Article 53
gives standing to anyone, at any time, within nine months from the time the
patent issues, to oppose the grant of a patent, and hands to the public the power
to help shape the law surrounding biotechnology. 172 People have the individual
choice of bringing an opposition against a patent on the grounds of morality. The
opposition proceedings illustrate the EPO’s sensitivity to public concerns.
Granting this power to the public means that legislatures and scientists are not
the sole morality check on innovation. 173 Rather, policy matters. 174 Public
opinion matters.

164

See EPC, supra note 80, arts. 1–3.
Id. arts. 52–53.
166
See id. art. 52.
167
Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States, Europe, and
Japan: How Much Patent Policy is Public Policy?, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 232 (2002).
168
EPC, supra note 80, art. 53. The morality Article also excludes “plant or animal varieties or essentially
biological processes for the production of plants or animals” and “methods for treatment of the human or animal
body by surgery or therapy and diagnostic methods practiced on the human or animal body.” Id.
169
Id. art. 99.
170
Id.
171
The Patenting Process, supra note 158.
172
EPC, supra note 80, at art. 99; see Chambers, supra note 167, at 233.
173
See Chambers, supra note 167, at 233 (discussing how “[i]n contrast, this type of standing is not
available to U.S. citizens following the decision in Animal Legal Defense Fund”).
174
See SHOBITA PARTHASARATHY, WIEBE E. BIJKER, W. BERNARD CARLSON & TREVOR PINCH, BUILDING
GENETIC MEDICINE: BREAST CANCER, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE 180
(Wiebe E. Bijker, W. Bernard Carlson & Trevor Pinch eds., 2007) (“. . . the European Patent Office has an
opposition mechanism . . . . The mechanism and potential grounds for opposition suggest that public health and
policy concerns are important to determinations of patentability.”).
165
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The globalization of biotechnology means that many companies have a
desire to file for a patent in multiple countries. 175 For this reason, many of the
same inventions have been examined by both the USPTO and the EPO. One
example of this was the patent on the Chakrabarty bacteria, the granting of
which was reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States, but not
challenged in Europe. 176
Another example is the Harvard oncomouse. The EPO examined the
transgenic oncomouse patent in its first attempt at struggling with the morality
clause. 177 In its first go-round, the EPO rejected the patent claiming the
oncomouse. 178 On review, the Technical Board of Appeals noted that the
oncomouse case was “precisely . . . this kind” of invention that invokes Article
53(a) considerations because of the manipulation of the genetic material of
mammals. 179 The Board remanded the case for further consideration under
Article 53(a). 180
The Examining Division set out to reconsider the patent in light of the Article
53(a) objections. The EPO used a balancing test to examine the morality
exception. 181 Ultimately, human disease, environmental concerns, and animal
cruelty took the front seat in terms of state interests. 182 Harvard created the
oncomouse to easily develop cancer with the hopes of furthering cancer
research. 183 The potential to further this research caused the first interest in
human disease to fall on the side of patentability. 184 With the mice remaining in
the control of the laboratories using them for research, the likelihood of mass
genetic dissemination proved low, and thus, the environmental concerns were
not significant enough to deny patentability. 185 Although the EPO recognized
that the mice would suffer from the inflicted cancer, the quantity of mice forced
to suffer was lower due to the genetic change. 186 The decreased number of

175

See Murphy, supra note 19, at 47.
PHILIP W. GRUBB, PATENTS IN CHEMISTRY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 152 (Oxford University Press 1986).
177
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 519.
178
T19/90, Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] E.P.O.R. 501 (Technical Board of Appeal 3.3.2 Oct. 3, 1990).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse, supra note 134. See Patent First, Ask Questions
Later, supra note 23, at 520 (citing Harvard/Onco-mouse, 1990 E.P.O.R. 501, 527) (“the question of morality
has to be examined and possible detrimental effects and risks have to be weighed and balanced against the merits
and advantages aimed at.”).
182
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 520.
183
Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse, supra note 134.
184
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 520.
185
Id.
186
Id.
176
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suffering mice weakened the animal cruelty factor to such an extent that it was
insufficient to counter-balance the potentially substantial medical benefits. 187
The EPO inevitably allowed the oncomouse patent to be granted finding that the
invention “can generally be regarded as beneficial to mankind.” 188
The granting of the oncomouse patent did not end the morality discussion,
but it did give the EPO a mechanism to approach morality claims under Article
53(a). 189 Unfortunately, the EPO did not strictly keep to the test. 190 The court
turned to another test, the “unacceptability test,” in Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic
Systems. 191 Again, the test did not last, as the court administered a third test, this
time it was the “public abhorrence test” in Howard Florey/Relaxin v. Fraktion
der Grünen im Europäishen Parlament. 192
The Howard Florey/Relaxin issue revolved around a patent on a sequence
of DNA, coding for the hormone Relaxin, isolated from a pregnant woman
through recombinant techniques. 193 The EPO considered a variety of arguments
to the patent including the morality bar. 194 The difficulty of this argument rested
on patentability being an inquiry of law not ethics, which was “beyond the
proper remit of European patent tribunals.” 195 Turning to the “overwhelming
consensus” of the state’s party to the EPC, the nature of the patent did not rise
to the level of “abhorrent.” 196 The standard of abhorrence severely decreased the
burden to overcome a morality challenge for an inventor seeking a patent. 197
Beyond creating a new test, the EPO rejected the balancing test used when
examining the Harvard oncomouse. 198
187

Id.; see Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse, supra note 130.
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 520–21.
189
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 521. Another transgenic mouse application was
contested at the EPO in the Upjohn case, but the Upjohn mouse was created to lose its hair for the purposes of
solving baldness. The balancing mechanism was used and the patent was denied because the invention “was
contrary to morality and therefore not patentable.” Bioethics and Patent Law: The Case of the Oncomouse, supra
note 134.
190
See Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 522.
191
Id. at 522–23 (citing T356/93, Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Sys., [1995] E.P.O.R. 357, 373, (Tech. Bd.
App. 1995)) (describing the unacceptability test as “[tying] patentability to the ‘public acceptability’ of the
general categories of patentable subject matter”).
192
Id. at 523–24 (citing T0272/95 Howard Florey/Relaxin, Application No. 83307553.4, [1995] E.P.O.R.
541).
193
Justine Pila, Intellectual Property Rights and Detached Human Body Parts, 40 J. OF MEDICAL ETHICS
27, 28 (2014).
194
T0272/95 Howard Florey/Relaxin, Application No. 83307553.4, [1995] E.P.O.R. 541.
195
Howard Florey/Relaxin, [1995] E.P.O.R. 541; Pila, supra note 189, at 28 (discussing the fourth ground
for rejecting the argument that the patent is immoral and thus not eligible for patentability).
196
Howard Florey/Relaxin, [1995] E.P.O.R. 541.
197
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 524.
198
Pila, supra note 193, at 28.
188
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After establishing three different tests, each consecutive test lowering the
effectiveness of the morality bar, the EPO faced a new element to consider in
granting a patent. The EPO incorporated the European Union’s Biotechnology
Directive (Biotech Directive) to use as guidance when considering patent
protection over biotech. 199 The EPO is an independent office that is not a part of
the EU; however, all EU countries are members of the EPO. 200 Because the EPO
is not a part of the EU, it did not have to incorporate the Biotech Directive, which
“subtl[y] attempt[ed] to steer the granting policy of the EPO in the field of
biotechnology indirectly.” 201 However, the EU member states were able to
encourage the EPO members to incorporate the Biotech Directive into the EPC’s
implementing regulations. 202
The goal of the Biotech Directive was to harmonize patent law and
incentivize research into biotechnology so Europe could compete within
industry. 203 However, because directives must be individually implemented by
each country, the Biotech Directive gave members of the European Union a
deadline to implement the directive into their national laws.204 Not all countries
agreed with the directive and some choose not to implement it into their national
laws. 205Another goal of the Biotech Directive is to ensure an ethical component
is considered when patent protection is sought. 206 To incentivize research, the
Biotech Directive specifically allows for certain biotech inventions to be

199
EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, supra note 18 (however, the Biotech Directive was incorporated in 1999);
Overwalle, supra note 152, at 441.
200
See INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW & POLICY, supra note 94, at 124. The distinction that the EPO is not
under the EU is important when the two bodies differ in their decisions. An example of a disagreement relates
to Article 53(b) of the EPC which has been determined to be at conflict with both a European Commission (EC)
decision involving the Biotech Directive and an EPC rule implemented in light of the EC decision. See generally
Cooley Alert, EPO May Return to Patenting Plants Obtained by an Essentially Biological Process, COOLEY
(Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2018/2018-12-14-epo-may-return-to-patenting-plantsobtained-by-an-essentially-biological-process.
201
Overwalle, supra note 152, at 441.
202
Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents in EPC, supra note 80,
at pt. II, ch. V, r. 26–29 (Implementing Regulations inserted by decision of the Administrative Council of June
16, 1999, which entered into force on Sept. 1, 1999).
203
Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 525 (“The first [goal] was to clarify and harmonize
the legal protection of biotech inventions in the region to increase investment in biotechnology research.”); see
Donna M. Gitter, Led Astray by the Moral Compass: Incorporating Morality into European Union
Biotechnology Patent Law, 19 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2001).
204
Sabine Louët, French Refuse to Implement Biotech Patent Directive, NATURE: BIOTECHNOLOGY (Aug.
2000), https://www.nature.com/articles/nbt0800_820.pdf?origin=ppub.
205
Id. France believed that if it implemented the objective it would handicap their already disadvantaged
biotech industry. Id.
206
Gitter, supra note 203, at 2. These moral provisions proved to be the most controversial of the Biotech
Directive. Id. at 3.
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patented, including human genes. 207 Intelligently, the Biotech Directive creates
some bright line rules on what is unpatentable due to morality issues. 208 These
inventions include “processes for cloning human beings, processes for
modifying the germ line genetic identity of human beings, uses of human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes, and processes for modifying the
genetic identity of animals which are likely to cause them suffering without any
substantial medical benefit.” 209 Even with a morality clause and categories of
statutorily disqualified inventions, the EPO still struggles with the issue of
morality through individual patents and cases.
Many years after the EPO granted the patent on the Harvard oncomouse, the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), a non-EPO adjudicatory body,
was asked to answer three questions concerning a German patent covering the
use of human embryonic stem cells. 210 Article 6(1) of the Biotech Directive
incorporates language from Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, which states
that “[i]nventions shall be considered unpatentable where their commercial
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality.” 211 The TRIPS
Agreement allows for a state to determine “whether a patent violates this
principle within the context of its own national conceptions of morality and
order.” 212 One exception applies to the discretion given to a State with respect
to human embryos, the industrial or commercial use of which is unpatentable. 213
The Brüstle v Greenpeace case dealt with a lack of clarity within the Article 6(2)
exception which did not make the meaning of “human embryo” clear. 214
The lack of clarity led Germany to define “human embryo” on a national
level in the Embryo Protection Act. 215 A subsequent act—the Stem Cell Act—
was passed, which specifically allowed for exceptions on the importation of
embryonic stem cells for research purposes or “to extend medical

207

Overwalle, supra note 152, at 452.
Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal
Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13 (EC) [hereinafter EU Biotech Directive].
209
Overwalle, supra note 152, at 452; see Biotech Directive, supra note 208.
210
Sophia Williams, Brüstle v. Greenpeace: The Court of Justice of the European Union Interprets the
Term “Human Embryo” Widely, Restricting Member States’ Discretion to Pass National Legislation for
Biotechnological Inventions, 20 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 571, 572 (2012).
211
EU Biotech Directive, supra note 208 (citing Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)) (implementing the language of TRIPS art. 27).
212
Williams, supra note 210, at 574–75.
213
EU Biotech Directive, supra note 208.
214
Williams, supra note 210, at 574.
215
Embryonenschutzgesetz [ESchG] [Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I
[BGBL. I] (Ger.) [hereinacter Embryo Protection Act].
208
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knowledge.” 216 The Brüstle case brought up the question of whether human
embryonic stem cells constituted human embryos within the meaning of Article
6(2) to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). 217
The court discussed the need for uniformity across the law, recognizing
consequences to inventors, and noted the lack of power granted to national law
by the Biotech Directive to determine the definition of “human embryo.” 218 Both
points led the Court to the conclusion that the Biotech Directive “must be
regarded . . . as designating an autonomous concept . . . which must be
interpreted in a uniform manner throughout the territory of the Union.” 219
Declining to “broach questions of a medical or ethical nature,” the court
restricted itself to a purely legal analysis. 220
To determine the meaning of the term “human embryo” the court began the
analysis at the preamble of the Biotech Directive discussing the goal of
incentivizing investment in biotechnology and preserving human dignity. 221 The
court took the term “human embryo” to mean “any human ovum after
fertilization” or “any non-fertili[z]ed human ovum into which the cell nucleus
from a mature human cell has been transplanted . . . . ” 222 Further, the court
found that although Germany’s national law creates an exception for research,
the Biotech Directive covers uses of embryos in that context as well because
receiving a patent directly implicates industrial and commercial use of the
research. 223 Finally, the court found that even if a patent does not claim human
embryos an application will be unpatentable if the destruction of human embryos
is used in the process of creating the claimed invention. 224
The CJEU in the Brüstle’s case did not adopt the technical analysis of the
EPO established by the three pre-Biotech Directive tests. 225 Instead, the current
inquiry at the CJEU requires an expanded analysis considering the values behind
the morality bar to patentability in the hopes that the statutory bar can ultimately

216
Gesetz zur Sicherstellung des Embryonenschutzes im Zusammenhang mit Einfuhr und Verwendung
menschlicher embryonaler Stammzellen [Stem Cell Act], May 28, 2002, [BGB1. 2002] at 2277 (Ger.).
217
Case C-34/10, Brüstle v. Greenpeace, 2011 E.C.R. I-09821 ¶ 22.
218
Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 28.
219
Id. ¶ 26.
220
Id. ¶ 30.
221
Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.
222
Id. ¶ 38 (including also “any non-fertili[z]ed human ovum whose division and further development
have been stimulated by parthenogenesis”).
223
Id. ¶¶ 41, 53.
224
Id. ¶ 47.
225
See also Pila, supra note 193, at 28.
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achieve its goals. 226 After the incorporation of the Biotech Directive to the EPO,
the EPO Enlarged Board of Appeals (EBOA) dealt with the rejection of the
Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation’s (WARF) application directed
towards cell cultures. 227 The EBOA did not adopt any of the pre-Biotech
Directive tests, and instead, affirmed the rejection of the patent claims because
the performance of the claim was the commercial exploitation prohibited by the
Biotech Directive and that performance contravenes ordre public by involving
the destruction of human embryos. 228
Ultimately, European countries protect moral concerns on some level
through various mechanisms both at the EPO and through national laws.
Whether a patent will be granted on a morally controversial biotechnology will
unavoidably depend upon who hears the case and how that court judicially
interprets the statutes.
C. Conclusion
The United States and Europe approach morality in patent law differently.
The United States does not use either utility or subject matter eligibility to
involve morality with patent law. European countries adopt a more sensitive
approach through their statutory patent laws.
The United States’ approach allows for a less restrictive developmental
approach through case law. 229 While the courts are free to do this, the demise of
the moral utility requirement and the subsequent cases examined under the
subject matter eligibility requirement suggest that morality could usefully play
a bigger role than it does currently. In contrast, the EPC and the EU Biotech
Directive statutorily define certain inventions as unpatentable because they are
deemed immoral. 230 Yet, as seen in the Brüstle case, even the statutory
application of morality can be problematic. Ultimately, with the difference in
approaches between the United States and Europe, an inventor can apply for a
patent in both countries, and even if the patent meets all other patentability
requirements, the patent may be awarded in only one or in neither.
226

Id.
Case G2/06, WARF/stem cells, [2009] E.P.O.R. 15, at ¶ 1 (Enlarged B. App. 2008).
228
Id. ¶¶ 25–29.
229
Laura C. Whitworth, Comparison of the Implementation of Statutory Patent Eligibility Requirements
Applied to Gene Patents in the European Union, the United States, and Australia, 56 IDEA 449, 471 (2016).
The patent claiming the BRCA genes was approached differently by the Australian High Court, and ultimately
resulted in a different holding, which shows one issue, inconsistency, with leaving it up to judicial decisions. Id.
at 473–74.
230
See also id. at 473.
227
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III. THREE-PART PROPOSAL
Biotechnology has the potential to revolutionize the way people live their
lives around the world. Yet, patent laws do not generally extend beyond the
borders of a particular jurisdiction. Society finds itself in a precarious position
where there is a potentially limitless industry, with profound effects on humans,
and no recourse on an international level to determine if we should or should not
pursue morally controversial biotechnology. It may be tempting to leave patent
law “morally neutral” and up to the discretion of other agencies or areas of the
law to achieve our moral goals, but that would be insufficient. 231 If society wants
to limit the use of morally controversial biotechnology, patent laws need to be a
part of that discussion. 232 Therefore, society must have a mechanism to utilize
should we decide that the morality concerns of a particular biotechnology
outweigh rewarding the innovation.
This proposal will focus on the patent component of addressing moral
considerations of biotechnology. Compared to regulatory laws, patent laws are
a government’s policy tool to “promote innovation, encourage the development
of new technologies, and increase the fund of human knowledge.” 233 A patent
rewards an inventor for their innovation by granting them an exclusive property
right in the new technology. 234 The bottom line is that we have to determine if
the innovation of morally controversial technology should be rewarded.
This Comment proposes a three-part plan to involve morality considerations
with patent law across the international community. The first component of the
plan will require an international recommendation (“Recommendation”). The
next component will propose a mechanism for implementation of the
recommendation on a national level, using the United States as an example. The
implementation of the recommendation will result in a binding national decision
on whether a patent will be granted on a morally controversial patent. The final
component will take the national decision and produce it to the international
market for persuasive authority.

231
See Patenting Medical Technology, supra note 29, at 318; See generally James R. Chiapetta, Of Mice
and Machine: A Paradigmatic Challenge to Interpretation of the Patent Statute, 20 W. MITCHELL L. REV. 155,
160–61, 178 (1994) (discussing how denying patents may impede regulatory efforts by forcing inventors to
protect their inventions through trade secrets and the proper venue to address moral concerns is regulatory
agencies).
232
See generally Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 535 (discussing how denying patent
protection on morally controversial technology does not stop people from practicing the technology but rather
reduces the “fuel” for doing so).
233
Burk & Lemley, supra note 104, at 1575.
234
See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2015).
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A. International Recommendation
Due to globalization, technological innovations affect every part of the
world. 235 While the global effect may benefit society through improved health
and increased quality of life, the moral concerns that exist with biotechnology
are also not restricted by geographic limitations. 236 The lack of territorial
restrictions combined with the incentive to innovate that patents produce means
that countries will need to work together to make decisions regarding the use of
morally controversial biotechnology.
This Comment proposes that an international, non-binding Recommendation
be brought for consideration at the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO). Any country could submit the Recommendation to WIPO, but there
would need to be agreement among countries for it to become a part of the
agenda. 237 WIPO serves as the best forum for this Recommendation because it
was specifically created for the purposes of facilitating cooperation. 238 The goal
of this proposal is to give countries a mechanism through which they can agree
on fundamental areas of moral concern and share national decisions.
The Recommendation would first make its way through the Standing
Committee on the Laws of Patents (SCP). The SCP is a committee established
by the General Assembly of WIPO to “serve as a forum to discuss issues,
facilitate coordination and provide guidance concerning the progressive
international development of patent law.” 239 At the SCP, the Recommendation
would be subject to negotiations, studies, and other considerations. 240 Any study
would likely take a substantial amount of time, but the delay would be offset by
a study’s ability to facilitate cooperation with the Recommendation. Because the
Recommendation will be non-binding, any information convincing various
countries that making the outlined changes is in fact worth it will ultimately

235
Rhett Power, This Is How Globalization Is Affecting Entrepreneurs, FORBES (July 15, 2018, 7:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rhettpower/2018/07/15/this-is-how-globalization-is-affecting-entrepreneurs/#5de
9052a1b7a.
236
Murphy, supra note 19, at 52.
237
General Rules of Procedure of WIPO, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/policy/en/rules_of_procedure.html
(last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (listing Rule 5: “[t]he assembly shall adopt its agenda at the first meeting of the
session”).
238
About WIPO, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
239
CAROLYN DEERE BIRKBECK, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO) A
REFERENCE GUIDE 78 (Edward Elgar pub., 2016).
240
Sisule F. Musungu & Graham Dutfield, Multilateral Agreements and TRIPS-Plus World: The World
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), 3 TRIPS ISSUES PAPERS 1, 6 (2003), available at https://quno.org/
sites/default/files/resources/Multilateral-Agreements-in-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf.
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benefit the international community and increase the Recommendation’s
chances for success.
The Recommendation’s non-binding nature does not detract from its value
and does not mean that countries will refuse to comply with it. While the TRIPS
Agreement has a binding venue for dispute resolution, any Recommendation in
front of the SCP at WIPO would require consensus to be adopted. 241 That
consensus, if achieved, could serve as a motivator for compliance. Each country
would be amenable to implementation or they would be less likely to agree to
the Recommendation.
The advantage to implementing the international recommendation in WIPO
as opposed to utilizing other mechanisms of international law, like the TRIPS
agreement, is that WIPO facilitates cooperation among member states,
intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the
enterprise sector. 242 It was specifically created for collaborative purposes such
as the type of cooperation needed to face morally controversial
biotechnology. 243 WIPO is uniquely situated to handle this recommendation.
Implementing this type of recommendation into the TRIPS agreement would
result in disarray. While every member of the WTO is bound by the TRIPS
Agreement, countries can choose not to comply with a WTO decision. 244 The
TRIPS Agreement has “teeth” because violations can be punished by retaliatory
sanctions. 245 In reality, the enforcement mechanisms of the TRIPS Agreement
do not ensure compliance. 246 The United States in particular has been out of
compliance with different TRIPS provisions for over a decade and has failed to

241
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting
TRIPs and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275, 277 (1997); see also Catherine Saez, WIPO
Patent Law Committee Looks at Health, Quality, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (June 7, 2017) (discussing
how the SCP could not reach agreement on future work but decided to revert to old work programs),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2017/07/06/wipo-patent-law-committee-looks-health-quality/.
242
Cooperation, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/cooperation/en/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
243
Id.
244
See Damian Paletta & Ana Swanson, Trump Suggests Ignoring World Trade Organization in Major
Policy Shift, WASHINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/03/01/
trump-may-ignore-wto-in-major-shift-of-u-s-trade-policy/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f5715d531de7; Daniel J.
Ikenson & Robert E. Lighthizer, Is The WTO Dispute Settlement System Fair?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Jan. 26, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/article/wto-dispute-settlement-system-fair (“WTO cannot force
us to comply with its rulings”).
245
See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPSs Agreement and New Dynamics of International
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2004).
246
Elena Bourtchouladze, US Again Target of Complaints of Persistent Non-Compliance at WTO DSB,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.ip-watch.org/2015/02/24/us-again-target-ofcomplaints-of-persistent-non-compliance-at-wto-dsb/.
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comply with a thirteen year-old decision by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body. 247
The SCP will need to make final determinations regarding the areas of
biotechnology that patent examiners should flag for morality considerations.
One of the most objectionable parts to including morality in a decision about
patents is who makes the morality determinations. 248 The composition of the
SCP includes the WIPO member states, certain other U.N. members, and some
international organizations and non-international organizations. 249 This
composition means that the “decision maker” deciding what categories of
inventions society deems concerning enough to flag is sufficiently varied. The
developing nations of WIPO will have just as much say in discussions as do the
major intellectual property powers, each of which gets one vote. 250 There will
not be the problem of “unintended or intentional ignorance” because of the
committee’s specific purpose of international patent development. 251 The
committee’s ability to dig deep into the issues and coordinate studies that will
explore the Recommendation’s ramifications also works to ensure that the
decisions made at this level of the process are the most beneficial for the
international community at large.
The Recommendation should include, at a minimum, flagging medical
treatment methods, cloning, genetic alterations on humans, and higher-life
forms. The categories are broad because the international community should be
over-inclusive in its consideration of morally controversial inventions. The
purpose of the recommendation intersects with the second component in that it
indicates to the patent offices where the major concerns lie.
Although the broad categories will increase the number of patent
applications reviewed overall, their benefits outweigh the alternative of creating
more narrow categories. The goal of reviewing moral considerations is to move
the law with science. Maintaining narrow categories would leave the
international community vulnerable to the same exploitation of science as it
would be without a plan.

247

Id.
See also Noonan, supra note 86 (“if we posit rules we need to impose a rule-giver”).
249
Standing Committee on the Law of Patents (SCP), WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/policy/en/scp/ (last
visited Feb. 12, 2019).
250
DEERE BIRKBECK, supra note 239, at 78.
251
Noonan, supra note 82.
248
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Simply recommending what might be worth a morality consideration is not
sufficient. National patent laws will need to adapt to these morality concerns by
adjusting their own practices.
B. Implementation on a National Level
While the WIPO Recommendation provides a good start, national laws will
have to adapt to accommodate to the Recommendation and work to enforce
flagging patents with questionable patent claims. Each individual patent office
can approach the task through its own mechanism. This Comment proposes that
patent offices, particularly the USPTO, should utilize a pre-screening method of
flagging. 252 This pre-screening method would work similarly to the United
States’ current approach to screening for national security interests. 253
As required by section 181, the USPTO pre-screens patent applications for
potential threats to national security. 254 If a patent application is flagged because
the Commissioner of Patents believes the disclosed invention “might . . . be
detrimental to the national security,” then the application is sent to defense
agencies for review. 255 The defense agency, upon a finding that the disclosure
“would be detrimental,” notifies the Commissioner of Patents to keep the
invention secret via a secrecy order. 256 The Commissioner then keeps the
application sealed and notifies the applicant that the patent would not be
published or granted for as long as the security interest remains. 257 The
application would be stayed for a period of one year, but the secrecy order can
be renewed so long as the national interest requires it. 258
If a secrecy order is issued an inventor may not commercially exploit the
invention. 259 Yet, once the secrecy order terminates, an applicant may receive a
patent if the invention is patentable. 260 Thus, patent laws do not leave the
patentee empty handed. 261 Section 183 allows for the patentee to receive
compensation if a patent would have been granted but for the secrecy order. 262
252

See generally Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 543–44.
35 U.S.C.S. § 181 (2012); see Patent First, Ask Questions Later, supra note 23, at 543–44.
254
35 U.S.C.S. § 181.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
See Farrand Optical Co. v. United States, 317 F.2d 875, 876 (2d Cir. 1962).
260
Gary L. Hausken, The Value of a Secret: Compensation for Imposition of Secrecy Orders Under the
Invention Secrecy Act, 119 MIL. L. REV. 201, 218 (1988).
261
See generally 35 U.S.C.S. § 183 (2018).
262
Id.
253
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This Comment proposes that the USPTO, and other patent offices around
the world, ought to implement a pre-screening process where every patent
application that relates to a new biotechnology is screened. Patent inspectors will
utilize pre-established categories of potentially morally controversial
biotechnology to flag claims for further review. Any claim that is flagged will
be held back from the patent prosecution process. 263 The controversial claim will
then be reviewed by a committee that could be separate or situated in the USPTO
for a determination of whether the biotechnology claim is something that society
ought to reward with a property right, or if the technology is too morally
controversial. 264 If the committee approves of the claim, then the applicant may
file for compensation. The approved claim would then be reexamined for
patentability and if granted would join the rest of the claims in getting patent
protection. Any claim that is determined to be too morally controversial to grant
a patent on would be barred from receiving patent rights. The USPTO will share
this information with other patent offices and with WIPO through the work share
system described in the Recommendation.
The inspectors at the USPTO can be any examiner that works within the
patent office. The purpose of the inspector is not to make morality
determinations, so there is no concern of “unintended or intentional ignorance”
as there is with decision makers. 265 The inspector is only tasked with following
the guidelines of the WIPO Recommendation.
Once an inspector flags an application, the claim will be removed and held
for examination. 266 An applicant may file a continuation-in-part to move the
unflagged part of the application through the regular patent process. 267 Holding
back only the potentially controversial claim serves two purposes. First, it
prevents the process from becoming overburdened. Second, it combats the
argument that this process will inhibit the incentive to innovate that patents
promote.
Currently, of all of the patent applications published worldwide every year,
the portion of biotechnology patents filed is relatively small. In 2015, 55,399
biotechnology patents were filed across all patent offices, making the share of
biotechnology patents only 2.2% of all published patents. 268 Not all biotech
263
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inventions will create concerns that qualify the patent for flagging, and the patent
office’s only hold back the individual claims of concerns. Additionally, every
jurisdictional patent office will work together to achieve the goal of making
decisions on all of the controversial claims. Because of the workshare system,
each country will not need to evaluate each claim independently. The efficiency
of offices working together will negate the argument that this system inhibits
innovation. Non-controversial claims will quickly be released from their hold
and allowed to continue through the prosecution process.
A patent is a legal protection for a product of human ingenuity. 269
Unfortunately, human ingenuity often takes significant time and resources, and
once created the invention costs little to copy. 270 Patents give an inventor the
right to exclude competitors so that he or she may recoup the cost of the
invention. 271 The patent can serve as an incentive for investors and businesses,
and it can also serve as an incentive for research and the progression of
science. 272 Undisputedly, patents have an effect on economics and industries. 273
Patents play a major role in companies since a company can maximize value
through patents. 274 The patent affects a company’s future strategy as the
company determines if it should sell, buy, or license technology. 275 French
economists found that “88 percent of U.S., European, and Japanese
businesses . . . actually rely upon the information disclosed in patents to keep up
with technology advances and direct their own [research and developments]
efforts.” 276
A resolution for businesses afraid of being denied a patent would be to
maintain the invention as a trade secret. For example, Myriad maintained the
269
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genetic testing database from its patient tests and can now hold this information
as a trade secret. 277 Trade secrets ultimately pose a problem by inhibiting the
public disclosure that the patentee gives up in order to gain the right to exclude.
Patents bargain with inventors in a way that allows the invention to become
public knowledge by giving the inventor the right to exclude others. 278 Without
the incentive of the right to exclude, the benefit of public disclosure is obsolete
and instead replaced with “every incentive to be secretive and guard jealously
their discoveries from competitors [which] could, of course, be copied with
impunity.” 279 If a company chooses to keep their information a secret, the public
never gets access to it and innovation could be stalled. 280
A decrease in financial investments could stifle innovation on important
biotechnology inventions that could generate improved medicines. If less
research, and by consequence, less discovery occurs in the medical field it raises
the question of whether patent law really promotes the “Progress of Science.” 281
Investors will put less money towards research and development in areas where
patent rights are uncertain or avoid the industry as a whole, which reemphasizes
the importance of the certainty patent holders get in their right to exclude. 282
While the incentive to innovate involves a complex discussion of bargains, costbenefits analysis, business investments, licensing, and trade secret concerns, it
remains one of the major policy considerations behind the patent system across
all jurisdictions. 283 For the biotechnology field to continue its growth, the
incentive to innovate must be kept at the forefront of the discussion so that the
field can reach its full potential. 284 That is not to say that the incentive to
innovate must be the sole consideration in future biotechnology and patent
discussions. In fact, the incentive to innovate must be considered against the
morality issues that the biotech innovations bring to the table.
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Importantly, the structure of this proposal recognizes the importance of the
incentive to innovate. Any non-flagged portion of the patent gets to proceed
through prosecution. Real investment can still happen because an applicant or a
business can still get patent protection and the right to exclude others.
Additionally, creating an opportunity to receive compensation for held claims
that are ultimately non-controversial means that companies will recoup some of
the lost costs. The only money that the patentee losses is over controversial
claims.
Once a claim is flagged, it would make its way to a committee established
by Congress. 285 This Comment does not purport to recommend certain people
for this committee by position, but rather state the importance and function of
the committee. Ideally, the people who sit on the committee will be of the highest
ethical and intellectual capacity. It would be helpful to have a small committee
of people who understand the science involved in biotechnology and the
industries future. This would help determine the severity of any concerns.
Examples of suitable people may include members of the National Academy of
Sciences, who go through an extensive vetting before being elected as
members. 286 Another avenue could be to revitalize the Office of Technology
Assessment (OTA). 287 Before the OTA’s demise, it provided non-partisan
research to Congress and even prepared reports covering biotechnology and
transgenic animals. 288 While the science is important, there must be educated
people on the committee who can study, debate, and consider the moral concerns
that the technology implicates.
While assessing the overall moral implications of patenting a new
biotechnology, the committee will need to assess if the invention is either too
controversial to receive the government reward of a patent right or is so
beneficial that a patent’s right to exclude harms society. 289 Congress can
establish guidelines for the committee during their discussions that may include
the illegal nature of practicing an invention, the lack of informed consent, or
general public opinion. 290 Having elected representatives with the power to
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make patent law in the United States puts Congress in the best position to hash
out the final details of the committee. 291
Any committee established by a country adhering to the WIPO
Recommendation will be tasked with the difficult decision of determining if an
inventions morality concerns bar it from receiving a patent.
C. Facilitating a Work Share System
This Comment proposes that WIPO, through the Recommendation, establish
a work share system for the countries of WIPO. 292 The purpose of the workshare
system would be to give patent offices and the public as a whole, ammunition
for the determination of morally controversial biotechnology.
After a patent office flags a claim to be held for consideration, the patent
office can add this information into the work share system. That will allow other
patent offices to know that the claim has been flagged and will be considered in
the future for morality concerns. This information can help patent offices from
reinventing the wheel and duplicating the assessment of individual claims.
Once a decision is rendered regarding the patentability of the claim, the work
share system would disseminate the information to other patent offices and the
public. Each patent office would then be able to see the decisions of other patent
offices regarding why patents had been approved or barred after the morality
screening process. For many patent offices, past decisions can act as persuasive
authority to adopt the same result. If a country elects not to follow the decision
of other patent offices, the decision would still be available to the public. Access
to why a decision was made and what considerations took place could easily
sway public opinion on an already controversial subject matter. With that
information at the public’s disposal, it gives them ammunition to affect change
in their countries.
Ultimately, the Recommendation provides an international tool for patent
offices to refer to when pre-screening morally controversial technology. As
patent offices come to their final decisions regarding the patentability of a
controversial claim, they can share that information with the international
community through the work share system. This proposal allows for society to
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have a mechanism for evaluating if morally controversial patent claims should
be eligible for patent protection.
CONCLUSION
Technology has taken people to space and provided almost every corner of
the globe with access to the internet, and both of those events were world
altering. It is hard to predict where the next incredible breakthrough will be, but
there is a good chance that it is in the realm of biotechnology. The industry’s
capabilities are truly limitless, and society should promote that innovation with
patent protection. Therefore, society should also be aware of some of the deeply
concerning consequences that developing biotechnology can have on society.
We should not continue blindly into the abyss without adequately preparing
ourselves for what comes next. That preparation needs to include an
international component given the ease with which technology and innovation
spreads across borders.
If society ever wants to ensure its own protection from the exploitation of
science it will need a mechanism to prevent governments from providing rights
over the fruits of innovation so that the incentive to develop morally
controversial biotechnology decreases. 293 The proposed Recommendation at
WIPO has the ability to bring territorially limited patent laws together to protect
morality. By creating categories for patent offices to flag, the international
community is defining where the areas of concern lie. It is then up to the patent
offices and national law to adhere to the regulation and consider the moral
implications of a technology during the patent procurement process. When the
patent office reaches a final decision, the conclusion should be turned over to
the international community in order to encourage a level of uniformity, but also
as a way of facilitating open communication.
We can improve our scientific capabilities in all areas without degrading our
moral compass. Biotechnology can provide humans with the answers to what
some have considered unsolvable issues, such as ending world hunger; but in
doing so, we must have a way to protect ourselves from our own curiosities. We
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must do this for ourselves and for our future. By creating an international
Recommendation and adhering to it on a national level, the international
community can ensure that science and curiosity does not move so quickly that
it outpaces the law.
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